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INTRODUCTION

A decade ago the biomedical research community was
sounding alarm bells about the impact of intellectual property
(IP) rights on the ability of scientists to do their work.'
Controversies and delays in negotiating terms of access to
patented mice2 and genes,3 databases of scientific information,4
and tangible research materials' all pointed toward the same
conclusion: that IP claims were undermining traditional sharing
norms to the detriment of science. Michael Heller and I
highlighted one dimension of this concern: that too many IP
rights in "upstream" research results could paradoxically restrict
"downstream" research and product development by making it
too costly and burdensome to collect all the necessary licenses.6
We called this phenomenon "the tragedy of the anticommons" in
biomedical research, a phrase that has since become a buzzword

1.
See, e.g., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (NIH) WORKING
GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS (1998), http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/index.htm
(noting styming effects of certain licensing agreements on university and government
research); Donald Kennedy, Enclosing the Research Commons, 294 SCIENCE 2249 (2001)
(comparing private restrictions on research to the fencing in of the American frontier);
Leon Rosenberg, Major Pharmaceutical Company: Bristol-Myers Squibb, in NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE DISSEMINATION OF
RESEARCH TOOLS IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 61 (1997) (attributing IP restrictions to
possible commercial interests).
2.
Eliot Marshall, DuPont Ups Ante on Use of Harvard'sOncoMouse, 296 SCIENCE
1212 (2002); Eliot Marshall, NIH, DuPont Declare Truce in Mouse War, 281 SCIENCE 1261,
1261-62 (1998); Sam Jaffe, Ongoing Battle over Transgenic Mice, SCIENTIST, July 19, 2004,
at 46, 46-47 (2004), available at http://www.the-scientist.com/article/print/14847/.
3.
Michael Balter, Transatlantic War over BRCA1 Patent, 292 SCIENCE 1818
(2001); Eliot Marshall, Companies Rush to PatentDNA, 275 SCIENCE 780, 780-81 (1997).
4.
AM. ASS'N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., AAAS RESOLUTION: STATEMENT ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION FOR DATABASES (1997), http://archives.aaas.org/
docs/resolutions.php?docid=446.
5.
Eliot Marshall, Need a Reagent? Just Sign Here... , 278 SCIENCE 212, 212-13
(1997).
6.
M.A. Heller & R.S. Eisenberg, Can PatentsDeter Innovation?The Anticommons
in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698-99 (1998); see also Carl Shapiro,
Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (A. Jaffe & J. Lerner eds., 2000) 119, 124
(referring to the tragedy of the anticommons and its stifling effect on innovation).
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for a broader range of potential detrimental effects of intellectual
property.

Since that time a number of studies have sought to put the
anticommons theory to empirical tests. The largest of these
studies have examined the impact of intellectual property on
research scientists (primarily in academia)8 rather than its
impact on downstream product development.9 The results
suggest that, overall, intellectual property has presented fewer
impediments to research than policymakers may have projected
on the basis of early salient controversies." Most scientists report
no difficulties in attempting to acquire IP-protected technologies,
and only a small percentage report significant delays in research
or having to abandon a project because of IP issues. Even in
fields characterized by extensive patenting, many academic
researchers seem to be either oblivious to the patents they might
be infringing or unconcerned about potential infringement
liability. More significant to researchers than patents as such
have been practical restrictions on access to materials and data,

7.
See, e.g., Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights
Hinder the Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons
Hypothesis 25, 27 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11465, 2005),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11465 (finding negative impact of patent
issuance on subsequent citations to corresponding publications).
8.
See Part II.C-D (discussing studies of the impact of intellectual property on
researchers in university, government, and public laboratories).
9.
Some studies have included interviews with representatives of commercial
firms. See, e.g., John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool
Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED
ECONOMY 285, 292-93 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) [hereinafter
Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents] (examining the effect of intellectual
property on research through interviews, including some interviews with personnel at
pharmaceutical and biotech firms) (discussed infra at Part ILA); Dianne Nicol & Jane
Nielsen, Patents and Medical Biotechnology: An Empirical Analysis of Issues Facing the
Australian Industry 64-71 (Univ. of Tasmania Ctr. for Law and Genetics, Occasional
Paper No.
6,
2003),
available at http://www.lawgenecentre.org/Publication%
20PDF/OccPaper%206.pdf (detailing results of surveys and interviews to gather data
from private sector companies) (discussed infra at Part II.E); see also JOSEPH STRAUS
ET AL., GENETIC INVENTIONS AND PATENT LAW, AN EMPIRICAL SURVEY OF SELECTED
GERMAN R&D INSTITUTIONS (Verlag Medien Design 2004) (discussed infra at notes Part
II.B). Some commercial scientists were included among the survey respondents in AM.
ASS'N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
EXPERIENCES: A REPORT OF FOUR COUNTRIES 6-8
(2007), available at
http://sippi.aaas.org/Pubs/SIPPIFourCountry-Report.pdf
[hereinafter
INT'L
INTELLECTUAL PROP. EXPERIENCES] (discussed infra at Part I.D).
10.
See Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human
Gene Patenting Controversies,24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1091, 1092 (2006) (indicating
gene patents have delayed scientific research among only 1% of biomedical researchers
surveyed).

1062

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[45:4

such as requirements for institutional assent to the terms of
materials transfer agreements (MTAs)."
Although still inconclusive in important respects, these
results are clearly telling us something. Taken together, these
findings point the way towards a more nuanced account of how a
proliferation of IP claims affects future research and product
development. As Heller & Eisenberg predicted, patents appear to
have a greater impact on downstream product development than
on upstream academic research. 2 But the findings that practical
restrictions on access to materials and data are more frequently
problematic than patents as such point to a further refinement of
the anticommons hypothesis that may have broader implications
for the design of property regimes: the burden of inertia matters
in determining the practical impact of transaction costs
associated with property rights. 3
With patents, the burden of inertia is on the property owner
to identify infringers and to enforce the patent against them. 4
When owners face high costs of detection and enforcement, it is
unlikely that they will bother to pursue claims of relatively low
value (such as claims against noncommercial academic
researchers). In this context, high transaction costs work to the
advantage of low-value users, mitigating rather than aggravating
the risk of an anticommons. By contrast, with material transfer
agreements and database access agreements, the burden of
inertia is on the user to obtain access to a restricted resource.15
The owner need not incur costs to identify and pursue users, but
may instead wait for prospective users to seek access. 6 In this
context, high transaction costs work to the detriment of low-value
users, increasing the risk of an anticommons. In order to
evaluate the risk of an anticommons, it is therefore necessary to
consider not only the number of rights that potentially stand in
the way of use and the level of transaction costs, but also
whether it is the owner or the user who bears the initial burden
11.
This finding is consistent with my own earlier observations in Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Bargaining Over the Transfer of ProprietaryResearch Tools: Is This Market
Failing or Emerging?, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 223, 225 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et
al. eds., 2001).
12.
Heller & Eisenberg, supranote 6, at 698.
13.
See Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 231 (noting delays of research associated with
MTAs).
14.
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and Data-Sharingin Public Science, 15 INDUS. &
CORP. CHANGE 1013, 1019 (2006).
15.
Id. (noting a researcher cannot gain access to materials and data without the
cooperation of a controlling third party).
16.
Id.
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of those transaction costs. These findings thus point towards a
more crisp account of the relationship between property rights,
transaction costs, and the risks of inefficient underuse. They also
suggest that, without adjusting the underlying property rights, it
might sometimes be possible to adjust the burden of inertia in
order to shift the balance between upstream incentives and
downstream anticommons effects.
II. WHAT THE DATA SHOW

A.

Walsh, Arora & Cohen Interviews in the U.S.

Perhaps the most prominent empirical investigations of the
impact of patents on biomedical research in the United States are
those reported in a series of papers from John Walsh, Wesley
Cohen, Charlene Cho, and Ashish Arora. In the first of these
studies, reported in 2003, Walsh, Arora & Cohen explored the
effects of research tool patents through seventy interviews with
personnel at biotechnology firms, pharmaceutical firms, and
universities in the United States. 7 The interview respondents
included attorneys, scientists, research managers, technology
transfer professionals, and government and trade association
personnel. 8 Industry respondents reported that although the
patent landscape had become more complex, and they might
therefore need to consider hundreds of patents for potential inlicensing in connection with product development, in the end
they would generally conclude that licenses were required for
only a handful of these patents. 9 The authors found almost no
evidence of a breakdown in negotiations over rights leading to
cessation of an ongoing R&D project." Although respondentsparticularly those in small biotechnology firms and universitiescomplained about the cost of access to research tools, they
reported only one example in which royalty stacking actually
caused a firm to terminate a project. 2' On the other hand, patent
attorneys for biotechnology firms reported that they evaluate the
patent landscape very early on in deciding what projects to
pursue, and that too many patents can be a "show stopper" if

17.
Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents, supra note 9, at 292; John P.
Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Working Through the Patent Problem, 299
SCIENCE 1021 (2003).
18.
Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents, supra note 9, at 292.
19.
Id. at 294-95.

20.
21.

Id. at 298.
Id. at 299.
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identified at an early stage.22 One interviewee recounted a
specific instance of patents on research tools dissuading a firm
from undertaking a project. 3 But the presence of patents is only
one of many factors that determine which projects a firm will
pursue further, and probably not the most important factor.
Summarizing the interviews, Walsh, Arora & Cohen
attributed the relatively small number of obstacles posed by
patents to a variety of "working solutions" on the part of firms
and universities to allow research to proceed (although at some
cost), including licensing, inventing around patents, going
offshore to do research beyond the reach of patents, developing
public domain databases and research tools, challenging the
validity of patents in court, and using patented technology
without a license (i.e., infringing).2 4
B. Straus,Holzapfel & Lindenmeir Interviews in Germany
Around the same time, the German government
commissioned a study by Joseph Straus and colleagues on the
effects of patents on genetic inventions in Germany.25 The study
involved interviews in a sample of twenty-five institutions in
Germany, including four large pharmaceutical firms, nine smalland medium-sized biotechnology firms, seven biotechnological
research institutions, and five clinical institutions associated
with universities performing R&D in the field of genetic
engineering.2 6 The German respondents reported that patent
owners were generally willing to license their inventions, but
expressed some concern over royalty stacking. The authors
summarized: "One to three licenses per marketable product could
be tolerated, but increasingly often seven or more licenses were
mandatory, endangering the commercialization of the final
product."2 7 The respondents indicated that patents on research
tools were infringed "behind locked laboratory doors," that
patentees were generally unaware of such infringements, and
that scientists might not be aware of the legal implications of
22.
Id. at 303.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 322-24, 328-29.
25.
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), GENETIC INVENTIONS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES: EVIDENCE AND POLICIES 4549 (2002) [hereinafter OECD GENETIC INVENTIONS]. For a more complete account of the
results, see Straus et al., supra note 9. Professor Straus's 2002 presentation of his data to
the OECD is posted on the Internet at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/22/1817995.pdf.
26.
The interviews were conducted over a seven month period in 2001-02. STRAUS
ET AL., supra note 9, at 12-13, 47.
27. Id. at 21.
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making or using patented research tools.2" Companies were
reluctant to pursue research in a field dominated by a
competitor's patents, but if the research were far enough along,
they would try to license or purchase any necessary patents.
C. Walsh, Cohen & Cho Survey of U.S. Biomedical Researchers
Walsh, Cohen & Cho followed the initial Walsh, Arora &
Cohen small sample of interviews with a larger but more
narrowly focused post-mail survey to a group of 414 biomedical
researchers working in the patent-rich fields of genomics and
and
nonprofit
in
university,
government,
proteomics
laboratories. ° They supplemented these data with a further
sample of scientists conducting research on one of three
important signaling proteins characterized by different levels of
patenting. 1 In a series of papers, they draw on these survey
results as well as the work of others to conclude that, despite
widespread complaints, patents have rarely blocked academic
research.32 They attribute this result to the fact that most
scientists are oblivious to the patents they may be infringing,3 3
and to the fact that most patent owners would not find it costeffective to sue academic researchers for infringement.34 Among
the thirty-two respondents who were aware of relevant patents,
twenty-four (75%) contacted the owner for permission to use the
IP, four (13%) had to change their research approach because of
difficulties in obtaining access, and five (16%) reported delaying
their research for more than a month. 35 Expressed as a
percentage of the total sample of respondents, approximately 6%
sought permission from patent owners to conduct their research,

28.
Id. at 26.
29.
OECD GENETIC INVENTIONS, supra note 25, at 47.
30. John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho & Wesley M. Cohen, View from the Bench: Patents
and Material Transfers, 309 SCIENCE 2002, 2002 (2005) [hereinafter Walsh et al., View
from the Bench]; John P. Walsh, Wesley M. Cohen & Charlene Cho, Where Excludability
Matters: Material Versus Intellectual Property in Academic Biomedical Research, 36 RES.
POL'Y 1184, 1185-86 (2007) [hereinafter Walsh et al., Where Excludability Matters]. See
generally Wesley M. Cohen & John P. Walsh, Real Impediments to Academic Biomedical
Research, 8 INNOVATION POL'Y & ECON. 1, 5-6 (2008) (further analysis of same results).
31.
Walsh et al., View from the Bench, supra note 30, at 2003.
Cohen & Walsh, supra note 30, at 9-10; Walsh et al., Where Excludability
32.
Matters, supra note 30, at 1191.
33.
Only 8% of the respondents believed that their research in the past two years
was covered by someone else's patents, and only 5% reported that they regularly check for
patents that might cover their research activities. Walsh et al., Where Excludability
Matters, supra note 30, at 1189-90.
34.
Cohen & Walsh, supra note 30, at 12-13.
35.
Walsh et al., Where Excludability Matters, supra note 30, at 1190.
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1% reported either changing or significantly delaying their
research plans as a result of patents, and none reported
abandoning a line of research entirely." Patents appeared to play
a somewhat larger role in decisions about what research projects
to pursue, with 7% of respondents according high importance to
"inputs patent free" in a list of reasons for choosing a research
project, 10% according high importance to "unreasonable terms,"
and 3% according high importance to7 "too many patents" in a list
of reasons for not pursuing a project.1
More significant to researchers than patents were
restrictions on access to tangible materials." Seventy-five percent
of the survey respondents had made at least one request for
research materials in the last two years, and although most of
these requests were fulfilled,3 9 19% of respondents "report[ed]
that their most recent request for a material was denied."' ° In the
past two years, failure to receive requested materials from
academic researchers led to reported delays of more than one
month for 68% of respondents and to abandonment of a project
for 22% of respondents, while failure to receive materials from
scientists in industry led to delays of more than one month for
40% of respondents and to abandonment of a project for 27% of
respondents.4' Comparing their data to previously reported
results from other researchers, 42 the authors suggest that
noncompliance with requests for research materials may be
increasing.4 3
D. AAASISIPPI MultinationalSurvey of Scientists
The American Association for the Advancement of Science
(AAAS), through its Project on Science and Intellectual Property
in the Public Interest (SIPPI), has provided data from separate
surveys of scientists in the United States, United Kingdom,

36. Id. at 1190. Respondents in the supplemental group of scientists working on
important signaling proteins were much more likely to report that they needed access to a
patent for their research and more likely to report having to abandon, modify, or delay a
project because of patents, but the numbers were still small. Id. at 1199.
37. Id. at 1188 tbl.2, 1189 tbl.3.
38. Id. at 1190-91.
39. Id. at 1191. Of the requests to other academics, 18% were not fulfilled, and 33%
of the requests to industry researchers were not fulfilled. Id.
40.
Walsh et al., View from the Bench, supra note 30, at 2002.
41.
Walsh et al., Where Excludability Matters, supra note 30, at 1192.
42.
See generally Eric G. Campbell et al., Data Withholding in Academic Genetics:
Evidence from a NationalSurvey, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 473, 479 (2002) (reporting survey
results on data withholding in scientific research).
43.
Walsh et al., Where Excludability Matters, supra note 30, at 1191-92.
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Germany, and Japan to assess their experiences in acquiring,
using, or creating intellectual property.' Survey respondents
were drawn from professional societies of scientists, not limited
to biomedical researchers, and invited by e-mail to complete a
self-administered survey instrument over the Internet.4 5
Although different investigators were responsible for the studies
in different countries and their results are not entirely
comparable, the authors of the SIPPI report found "very little
evidence of an 'anticommons problem' in survey results from the
United States and Japan. s
In the U.S. survey, 33% of respondents reported having
experienced difficulties in attempting to acquire IP-protected
technologies, including 25% of academic respondents and 40% of
industry respondents.47 Of those who experienced difficulties,
60% complained that licensing negotiations were "overly
complex," and 38% reported a "breakdown of licensing
negotiations." s Yet among the respondents who experienced
difficulties, only 11% of both industry and academic respondents,
or about 1% of the total universe of over 2,000 survey
respondents, reported abandoning a research project. 49 More
commonly, acquisition difficulties led to project delays or to
changes such as "using different tools or technologies,"
"'inventing around' a patented technology," "chang[ing] the
geographic location of the project," or "chang[ing] project goals.""°
In the Japanese survey, the universe of respondents was
drawn exclusively from university and public laboratories and
did not include scientists working in industry.51 Twelve percent

INT'L INTELLECTUAL PROP. EXPERIENCES, supra note 9, at 6.
44.
45. Id. at 6-7.
46. Id. at 12. According to the authors, it was possible to make comparisons only
between the U.S. and Japanese datasets. The number of people invited to take the
German and U.K. surveys was not known, but the response rates were likely quite small.
The authors concluded that these datasets could not be compared either to each other or
to the U.S. and Japanese datasets. Id. at 7-8.
47.
STEPHEN A. HANSEN, MICHAEL R. KISIELEWSKI & JANA L. ASHER, AM. ASS'N FOR
THE ADVANCEMENT OF SC., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EXPERIENCES IN THE UNITED
STATES SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY 24 (2007), available at http//sippi.aaas.org/
Pubs/SIPPI US IPSurvey.pdf. Of the respondents, 44% reported difficulties in acquiring
IP-protected technology from academia. Only 29% reported difficulties with acquisitions
from industry, and 30% reported difficulties with acquisitions from the GNHC sector. Id.
Id. at 25.
48.
49.
Id. at 25, 61.
Id. at 25.
50.
51.
JOHN P. WALSH & HSiN-I HUANG, AM. ASS'N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI.,
RESEARCH TOOL ACCESS IN THE AGE OF THE IP SOCIETY: RESULTS FROM A SURVEY OF
at
http://sippi.aaas.org/Pubs
available
9
(2007),
SCIENTISTS
JAPANESE
SIPPIJapan IP Survey.pdf.
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said that "they had acquired patented technologies from outside
[their laboratories] in the past five years," and 11% of this subset
reported difficulty in gaining access to a patented technology in
the last five years.52 Of those reporting difficulties, 45% indicated
that the royalty was too high; 27% indicated that negotiations
were too complex; and less than 10% indicated that the patents
could not be licensed, that the request for a license was denied,
that negotiations broke down, or that royalties were required for
multiple patents. 3 Only one respondent, or 0.1% of the entire
universe of respondents, reported abandoning a project because
of the difficulties.54
The German study solicited respondents by e-mail from
members of selected professional organizations of scientists."
Twenty percent reported that they had acquired IP-protected
technology for use in their work.56 Out of this subset, 23% (or 5%
57
of all respondents) reported having difficulties in acquiring IP,
and less than 1% (or 0.1% of all respondents) reported having
abandoned research due to these difficulties.58 The most frequent
reason reported for the difficulties in acquiring IP was "overly
complex patent licensing negotiations" (50% of the subset of
respondents who reported difficulties). 5 Next in order of
frequency were "individual royalties were too high" (34% of the
subset), "unable to determine the IP status of the technology"
(34% of the subset), "licensing negotiations broke down" (22% of
the subset), and "request for license denied" (19% of the subset).6 °
Only two respondents, or 6% of the subset, checked "royalties
required for multiple patents" as a reason for difficulties in
acquiring IP. 6
The U.K. study relied upon professional societies of
scientists to forward e-mail invitations to their members to
complete the survey. 2 Twenty-seven percent of the respondents
52.

Id. at 9-10.

53.
54.

Id. at 33 tbl.3-2.
Id. at 10.

55.
S. WESTERBURG ET AL., AM. ASS'N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI.,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EXPERIENCES IN THE GERMAN SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY 18 (2007),

available at httpJ/sippi.aaas.org/Pubs/SIPPIGermanyIPSurvey.pdf.
56.
Id. at 11.
57.
Id. at 21 fig. 10.
58.
Id. at 21 fig.ll.

59.

Id. at 46.

60.
61.

Id.

Id.

62.
MICHAEL R. KISIELEWSKI, JANA L. ASHER & STEPHEN A. HANSEN, AM. ASS'N FOR
THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EXPERIENCES IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY 30 (2007), available at httpJ/sippi.aaas.org/
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indicated that they had acquired IP-protected technology in the
past five years,63 and 25% of this subset reported having
encountered difficulties in accessing the technology.64 Of the
group reporting difficulties, 61% indicated that "licensing
negotiations were overly complex," 26% indicated that "licensing
negotiations had broken down," and 21% indicated that "royalties
were too high."" The most common effects of the difficulties
reported were that projects were delayed (37%) or that projects
had to be changed (16%).66 Only 8% of those experiencing
difficulties reported abandoning a project as a result of the
difficulties.67
The AAAS-SIPPI data are limited in accordance with the
focus of the project on the experience of research scientists, but
within that context they suggest that IP has so far presented
only limited problems. These results shed little light, however, on
the impact of upstream IP on downstream product development.
E. Nicol & Nielsen Survey and Interviews in Australia
Dianne Nicol and Jane Nielsen studied the impact of patents
on the Australian medical biotechnology industry through a
combination of (1) written surveys mailed to research
institutions,
public
and
private
biotechnology
and
pharmaceutical companies, and diagnostic genetic testing
facilities, and (2) "semi-structured interviews" with participants
in each of these sectors. 8 Respondents expressed mixed views as
to the impact of patents on research, with the most sharply
negative views coming from diagnostic facilities6 9 and the most
positive views coming from biotechnology and pharmaceutical
companies. 7' Respondents from diagnostic laboratories were

Pubs/SIPPIUKIP Survey.pdf.
63.
Id. at 9.
64.
Id. at 11.
65.
Id. at 12.
66.
Id.
67.
See id. (reporting that 3 out of the 37 respondents had abandoned a project due
to difficulties acquiring IP-protected technology).
68. Nicol & Nielsen, supra note 9, at x. The researchers found that "large scale
patenting is not the norm in the Australian industry," id. at 78, and that although
respondents file for patents in Australia, they perceive Australian patents as less
valuable than U.S., E.U., and Japanese patents. See id. at 80 (noting that respondents
showed "a certain degree of ambivalence about the value of Australian patents").
69.
See id. at 83 (indicating that none of the respondents from diagnostic facilities
believed that patents have a positive impact on research, 39% stated that patents have a
negative impact, and 23% stated that the impact varies).
70.
See id. (reporting that 68% of respondents from biotechnology and
pharmaceutical companies stated that patents have a positive impact, 2% stated that they
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particularly critical of the impact of patents on gene sequences
and gene products. 1
Asked about the impact of patents on their own work, 18% of
respondents from industry reported that their company had
changed its research program because of a patent that blocked
access to key research tools or materials. 2 In follow-up
interviews, many respondents reported that they worked around
blocking patents "by changing the direction of their research so
as to avoid infringing the patent(s)," while others reached
successful license agreements.73 Of the interviews with
respondents from private companies, 12% of companies "reported
being refused a patent license," while 9% of interview
respondents from research institutions and none from the
diagnostic laboratories reported that they had been refused a
patent license.74 Some respondents complained that patent
owners, although willing to license, demanded unreasonable
terms, and some respondents, particularly from universities,
conceded that they used patented research tools without
licenses.75
Although 84% of companies, 50% of research institutions,
and 23% of diagnostic facilities "routinely conduct patent
searches to ensure that their research does not infringe patents
held by others," 6 interviews revealed that such searches typically
await the discovery of something of commercial value.77 Patent
attorneys reported that, although an ever-growing number of
patents must be analyzed to determine if they impact a research
project, in most cases upon further investigation "the number of
problematic patents can often be reduced to two to three."7 These
attorneys further indicated that anything beyond that small
number is a serious problem that may block the research from
going forward. 9 Somewhat surprisingly, a higher percentage of
the research institutions (52%) than of the companies (45%)

have a negative impact, and 17% stated that the impact varies).
71.
See id. (noting that 77% of respondents from diagnostic facilities stated that
patents on gene sequences have a negative impact and 69% stated that patents on gene
products have a negative impact).
72.
Id. at 140-41.
73.
Id. at 143.
74.
Id. at 145-46.
75.
Id. at 147.
76.
Id. at 178.
77. Id. at 180.
78.
Id. at 183.
79. Id. at 182-83 (claiming that in most instances, there will be less than ten
.problematic patents" and anything beyond that would be a "real problem").
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reported that they had in-licensed patented tools and/or
materials for research purposes." Roughly half of respondents
reported no in-licensing activity at all, and interviews with those
that were required to negotiate licenses suggested that generally
no more than five licenses were necessary to achieve freedom to
operate. 8' The interviews suggested that if a project requires too
many licenses it will simply not move forward into the
development phase.82 However, the data did not allow Nicol &
Nielsen to quantify how often patent obstacles led to
abandonment of research projects.8 3
F. DNA Diagnostics
Some of the reports summarized above note that patents
seem to be more problematic in the area of DNA diagnostic
product development than in other fields of biomedical research.84
Empirical evidence in the United States suggests that patents on
genes have impeded both the provision of genetic testing services
and the development of new tests by diagnostic laboratories.
Mildred Cho and collaborators conducted telephone survey
interviews with 132 directors of laboratories that perform DNAbased genetic tests in the United States." These laboratories
were affiliated with companies, universities, government,
nonprofit institutions, and hospitals. 8 Seventy-five percent of
these laboratories held patent licenses, 65% had been "contacted
by a patent or license holder regarding the laboratory's potential
infringement of a patent by performance of a genetic test," 25%
had stopped performing a clinical genetic test because of a patent
or license, and 53% had decided not to develop a new clinical
genetic test because of a patent or license. Of those who had
been contacted regarding potential infringement, laboratory
directors at private companies were significantly more likely

80.
Id. at 184.
81.
Id. at 185-86.
Id. at 186-87.
82.
83.
Id. at 187.
See Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents, supra note 9, at 317-19
84.
(finding that clinical research using DNA diagnostic tests is a major exception to the norm
of "leaving university researchers alone"); see also Nicol & Nielsen, supra note 9, at 83
(noting negative views towards patents of interviewees from diagnostic laboratories); id.
at 201 (noting that "many respondents expressed concern about the impact of gene
patents on genetic testing services").
Mildred K. Cho et al., Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provisionof Clinical
85.
Genetic Testing Services, 5 J. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICs 3, 3 (2003).
86.
Id. at 4 tbl.1.
87.
Id. at 4-5.
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than those at universities to report that they had been prevented
from performing a test (71% of laboratories in companies versus
24% of those at universities).88 The authors had previously
obtained similar results in a case study of the impact of patents
related to genetic tests for hereditary haemochromatosis."9
It is not clear whether the difficulties documented in these
studies arise from the challenge of negotiating multiple licenses
in the face of a proliferation of patents, as distinguished from the
inability to reach agreement with a single obstreperous patent
holder." Some laboratories have apparently been stymied in their
ability to offer particular genetic tests by the licensing practices
of particular firms, such as Myriad Genetics in the case of breast
cancer, that either own or have exclusive licenses to key
patents. 91 Whatever the implications of these difficulties for R&D
and for clinical practice, the results do not inherently suggest an
anticommons problem. On the other hand, some DNA diagnostic
products, such as microarrays that include many different genes
and mutations, could face an anticommons problem if the burden
of negotiating many necessary licenses consumes too much of the
expected value of the product. This may be why microarray
developer Affymetrix has been an outspoken opponent of patents
on DNA sequences."
G. Mouse Models
Another notorious example of difficulties in negotiating
license terms for patented research tools from a single licensor is
the case of genetically altered mice.93 One firm, DuPont, obtained

88.
Id. at 5.
89.
See Jon F. Merz et al., Diagnostic Testing Fails the Test: The Pitfalls of Patents
Are Illustrated by the Case of Haemochromatosis, 415 NATURE 577, 577-78 (2002)
(indicating that patents kept 30% of laboratories that had the ability to develop and
perform tests for hereditary haemochromatosis from doing so).
90.
See Nicol & Nielsen, supra note 9, at 187 (acknowledging it can be difficult to
measure problems that are potentially associated with the negotiation of multiple licenses
because the project may be dropped after it becomes apparent that it would be difficult to
negotiate a single license).
91.
Sirpa Soini, Sdgolbne Aym6 & Gert Matthijs, Patentingand Licensing in Genetic
Testing: Ethical,Legal and Social Issues, 16 EUR. J. OF HUMAN GENETICS 10, 15 (2008).
92.
See Barbara A. Caulfield, Why We Hate Gene Patents, LAW.COM, Dec. 30, 2002,
on
author's
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1039054490790
(noting, based
experience at Affymetrix, that the cost of licenses and litigation can grow exponentially
when multiple patents are involved, leading to an inefficient allocation of resources); see
also Dianne Nicol, Navigating the Molecular Diagnostic Patent Landscape, 18 EXPERT
OPINION ON THERAPEUTIC PATENTS 461, 468 (2008) (noting that companies involved in
microarray technology are likely to face the greatest complexity in securing freedom to
operate).
93.
See generally NAVL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SHARING LABORATORY RESOURCES:
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dominant patent rights as the exclusive licensee of Harvard
University on both oncomice (i.e., mice that have been genetically
engineered to be susceptible to cancer) and cre-lox technology for
creating "knockout" mice (i.e., mice in which certain genes are
deleted in specific tissues).9" Oncomice and cre-lox mice are both
important research tools.95
In a series of papers, Fiona Murray has described the impact
of patenting on the dissemination of the oncomouse and the
response of the scientific community to licensing terms offered by
DuPont." This is a case study based on document review and
interviews rather than on quantitative analysis of data, but
because of the twenty-year timeframe and wide range of
perspectives that Murray consulted, it offers an unusually rich
account of this particular episode.9 7 Although difficulties in
negotiating with a single patent holder do not count as an
anticommons, close consideration of such a salient episode can
illuminate perceptions of the risk of bargaining breakdowns
when an institution contemplates the need to negotiate with
multiple licensors. The greater the number of essential licensors,
the greater the total risk of bargaining breakdown.
In 1984, scientists at Harvard University created a mouse
that was genetically engineered to have a predisposition to
cancer." The research had been sponsored by DuPont, and under
the terms of the funding agreement, Harvard patented the
invention and licensed it exclusively to DuPont.99 By the time the
first of the Harvard oncomouse patents issued, oncomice had
become an important tool for the mouse research community,'0 0
and given the broad scope of the claims, there was little prospect
of inventing around the patent. The patent claims purported to
GENETICALLY ALTERED MICE 3 (1994).

94.
Id. at 21-22; see also Marshall, NIH, DuPont Declare Truce in Mouse War,
supra note 2,at 1261.
95.
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 93, at 18.
96.
See Fiona Murray, Patenting Life: How the Oncomouse Patent Changed the
Lives of Mice & Men (Sept. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Houston Law
Review),
available
at
http://www.bus.wisc.edu/insitelevents/seminars/documents/
OncomouseChapterShort_09242007.doc [hereinafter Murray, Mice & Men]; Fiona
Murray, The Oncomouse that Roared: Resistance and Accommodation to Patenting in
Academic Science (Mar. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Houston Law
Review), available at http://web.mit.edu/fmurray/www/papers/THE%200NCOMOUSE%
20THAT%2OROAREDFINAL.pdf [hereinafter Murray, The Oncomouse that Roared].
97.
See Murray, The Oncomouse that Roared, supra note 96, at 7 (concentrating
analysis on how individual scientists deal with roadblocks to research that patents may
present).
98.
Id. at 1.
99.
See Murray, Mice & Men, supra note 96, at 5-7.
100.
Id. at 4-7.
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reach any "transgenic non-human mammal all of whose germ
cells and somatic cells contain a recombinant activated oncogene
sequence introduced into said mammal.., at an embryonic
stage."'
DuPont offered the mice to researchers on terms that
provoked outrage in the academic community. 2 These terms
included a $50 price tag, a prohibition on any further sharing or
breeding of the mice, annual disclosure to DuPont of research
results, and a grant-back to DuPont of rights in any future
discoveries arising from use of the mice.'1°
Some scientists responded with "civil disobedience," willfully
ignoring the patent while creating their own mice and lobbying
their universities to refuse to sign the DuPont agreement.
Mouse geneticists discussed strategic responses at scientific
meetings, and the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) held a
workshop and published a report on the topic.' The Director of
the National Institutes of Health (NIH) became personally
involved in negotiations with DuPont. 6 After four years of high
level negotiations, DuPont and NIH finally signed a
Memorandum of Understanding that permitted academic
scientists to use oncomice without cost for noncommercial
purposes, but did not permit them to transfer the mice to
scientists at other institutions without using a DuPont MTA, nor
to use them in industry-sponsored research. 7 These restrictions
have proven to be an ongoing source of problems between DuPont
and the scientific community, even years after the NIH
Memorandum of Understanding.'
On the other hand, the DuPont episode proved to be an
important trigger for a variety of moves on the part of the
scientific community to clarify and fortify its norms concerning
the exchange of research materials and data. The NIH, the NAS,
and the university technology transfer community each
101.
U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 col.9 1.35-col.10 1.2 (filed June 22, 1984).
102.
Murray, Mice & Men, supranote 96, at 8-9.
103.
Id. at 8.
104.
Murray, The Oncomouse that Roared, supra note 96, at 27-28.
105.
See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 93 (providing a summary of the
National Academy of Sciences workshop, held March 23-24, 1993).
106.
Murray, The Oncomouse that Roared, supra note 96, at 31.
107.
Id.
108.
See Sasha Blaug, Colleen Chien & Michael J. Shuster, Managing Innovation:
University-Industry Partnershipsand the Licensing of the HarvardMouse, 22 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 761, 762-63 (2004) (noting that some universities felt the Memorandum
of Understanding alone should govern use of the oncomouse for research); Marshall,
DuPont Ups Ante on Use of Harvard'sOncoMouse, supra note 2, at 1212 (reporting that
DuPont has increasingly sought to enforce its patent); Jaffe, supra note 2.
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responded to this and other salient controversies by
promulgating hortatory guidelines and "best practices""9 that
have had an impact on licensing practices, particularly on the
part of universities. 0 They may thereby have helped to minimize
the transactional burden that might otherwise have confronted
academic institutions, preventing potential anticommons
problems in the future.
III. UNDERSTANDING THE DATA
What do these studies tell us about the validity of the
anticommons hypothesis? To repeat, that hypothesis was that too
many IP rights in "upstream" research results could restrict
"downstream" research and product development by making it
too costly and burdensome to collect all the necessary licenses."
Reviewing the evidence in an article in Nature Biotechnology,
Timothy Caulfield, Robert Cook-Deegan, F. Scott Kieff, and John
Walsh conclude that (1) "the effects predicted by the
anticommons problem are not borne out in the available data;"
and (2) the "effects are much less prevalent than would be
expected if its hypothesized mechanisms were in fact
operating.""'
A fairer reading of the evidence to date would be that:
(1) most of the available data measure the effects IP rights have
on "upstream" research itself rather than the predicted effects on
"downstream" product development; (2) to the extent that the
data shed light on "downstream" effects, they provide evidence
that the hypothesized mechanism is indeed operating, although
the effects so far may be less serious than predicted; and

109.
See, e.g., Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and
Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources: Final Notice,
64 Fed. Reg. 72,090, 72,090 (Dec. 23, 1999) (attempting to promulgate guidelines to
promote and facilitate the use of research tools in the field of biomedical technology); CAL.
INST. OF TECH. ET AL., IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: NINE POINTS TO CONSIDER IN LICENSING

UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY 1-9 (2007), available at http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/
2007/march7/gifs/whitepaper.pdf (positing various approaches and solutions to apply in
the area of technology sharing); COMM. ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF AUTHORSHIP IN THE

BIOLOGICAL SCIS., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SHARING PUBLICATION-RELATED DATA AND
MATERIALS: RESPONSIBILITIES OF AUTHORSHIP IN THE LIFE SCIENCES 18 (2003) (revisiting
core principles for sharing data and research in the scientific community); NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1.
110.
See Lori Pressman et al., The Licensing of DNA Patents by US Academic
Institutions:An Empirical Survey, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 31, 32 (2006) (studying to
what extent academic institutions were already adhering to the suggestions published by
the NIH).
111.
Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 698.
112.
Caulfield et al., supra note 10, at 1092.
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(3) within "upstream" research, the hypothesized mechanism is
more apparent for MTAs than for patents.
These are significant and interesting results that have
important implications for the anticommons hypothesis, for
further study, and for public policy. Intellectual property
presents tradeoffs between ex ante incentives and ex post costs.
The anticommons hypothesis highlights one dimension of those
costs, and it is important to understand the magnitude of its
effects in order to put in proper perspective the costs and benefits
of enhanced IP protection for upstream research. If the costs
associated with determining and clearing rights are relatively
small and manageable, and the upstream benefits of IP
incentives are relatively high, then perhaps the upstream
expansion of intellectual property has been a good thing.
Conversely, if the benefits are relatively small and the costs are
significant, then perhaps the system could be improved. I
consider separately the evidence with respect to "downstream"
and "upstream" effects below.
A. Downstream Effects
The studies attempting to measure the anticommons effects
have focused relatively little attention on downstream product
development."' Instead, the largest and most comprehensive of
the studies have focused on the effects of upstream research
itself, primarily from the perspective of individual scientists. This
may be because the initiatives that have spawned the most
extensive studies have come from the scientific community,"' or
it may be because effects on product development are harder to
measure.
To the extent that the studies compare effects in academia
with those in industry, they suggest that patents impose greater
costs on scientists in product developing firms than they impose
on academic scientists (who generally ignore them)."' For

113.
See supra Part II.
114. E.g., Walsh et al., Where Excludability Matters, supra note 30, at 1188
(background paper for NAS study of patents in genomics and proteomics); see also INT'L
INTELLECTUAL PROP. EXPERIENCES, supra note 9, at 6 (noting that the AAAS-SIPPI study
.arose out of concerns over the effects of IP protections on the conduct of scientific
research").
115.
This is exactly as predicted in Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 700-01 ("Use
of a patented invention in an academic laboratory or a small start-up firm may be
inconspicuous, at least if not described in a publication or at a scientific meeting. Patent
owners may be more reluctant to sue public sector investigators than they are to sue
private firms. Differences in institutional cultures may make academic laboratories and
biotechnology firms more tolerant of patent infringement than large pharmaceutical

20081

ANTICOMMONS IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH

1077

example, the SIPPI data include some survey responses from
scientists in industry."6 In the United States, difficulties in
attempting to acquire IP-protected technologies were more
common among industry respondents (40%) than among
academic respondents (25%).'
Survey responses of individual scientists, even those in
industry, may not be the best way to observe effects on product
development. In the Nicol & Nielsen survey of Australian
biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms, 18% of the firms that
responded reported having changed their research programs
because a patent blocked access to key research tools or
materials."' But the response rate was quite low (27%), and some
of the firms that declined to fill out the survey preferred to
participate through interviews." 9
Institutional representatives such as lawyers or research
managers may know more than working scientists about product
development decisions and how they are made. Both the Walsh,
Arora & Cohen study and the Nicol & Nielsen study included
interviews with such representatives. 2 ' Although their small
numbers raise questions about whether the responses are
representative,12 ' both sets of interviews tell similar stories. The
results suggest, as predicted by the anticommons hypothesis,
that firms incur significant costs in culling through multiple
patents to determine what licenses are necessary, and that these
costs are greater in fields characterized by more patents.'2 2 For
example, a lawyer for a large pharmaceutical firm told Walsh,

firms.")
116.
See supra Part II.D (discussing the SIPPI survey and its results).
117.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
118.
Nicol & Nielsen, supra note 9, at 140-41.
119.
Id. at 66.
120.
Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents, supra note 9, at 292; Nicol &
Nielsen, supra note 9, at 67.
121.
Nicol & Nielsen conducted a total of forty interviews, including CEOs, IP
personnel, and bench scientists from private industry; directors of research groups, bench
scientists, and technology transfer personnel from research institutions; and directors of
research groups in diagnostic testing facilities, as well as outside patent attorneys,
licensing consultants, and government and trade representatives. Nicol & Nielsen, supra
note 9, at 67-68. Walsh, Arora & Cohen conducted a total of seventy interviews, including
twelve lawyers, three scientists, and nine business managers from the pharmaceutical
industry; seven lawyers, four scientists, and seven business managers from the
biotechnology industry; ten scientists and three business managers from universities;
seven outside lawyers; five government and trade association personnel; and three
additional scientists. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents, supra note 9, at 293
tbl.1.
122.
Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents, supra note 9, at 293-94; Nicol &
Nielsen, supra note 9, at 156, 178-81.
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Arora & Cohen that lawyers in the small molecule division in his
firm are responsible for eight projects each, while those in the
biotechnology division of the same firm are only responsible for
about two projects each because of the greater complexity of the
in-licensing issues that they must manage."' This is clear
evidence that transaction costs are higher in fields characterized
by more patents. It is less clear whether one lawyer for every two
projects-or even one lawyer for every eight projects-is a large
number or a small number in any meaningful sense. One
Australian patent attorney told Nicol & Nielsen that ten times
more patent searching is done now (i.e., in 2002-2003 when the
interviews were conducted) than a decade earlier, while another
reported that searching "has always been a headache" and is no
more so now than in the past, given the availability of superior
databases today.'24 Perhaps improvements in information
technology have mitigated the anticommons problem somewhat
by making it easier to search through large numbers of patents
efficiently. 2' On the other hand, electronic searching may reveal
more patents that require professional review to ensure freedom
to operate, increasing transaction costs. Trends toward more
aggressive claiming strategies may have further expanded the
universe of potentially relevant patents. 12' A number of
respondents told Nicol & Nielsen that because of the increasing
breadth of patent claims, it is now necessary to analyze more
patents in detail in order to determine whether they must be
licensed; however, at the end of this analysis, the number of
patents that prove to be potentially problematic generally
remains small. 2 7
The need to review a large number of patents for freedom to
operate, although plainly costly, does not necessarily pose an
insurmountable obstacle to product development. A consistent
story in the interviews is that the number of patents that require
evaluation for freedom to operate purposes is much larger than
the number that ultimately require licensing.'2 8 One Australian
respondent estimated that a typical freedom to operate search
might uncover anywhere from a dozen to thirty or forty patents
that are relevant, but that upon closer analysis "there may be
only one or two or a few more that are blocking," and that

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents,supra note 9, at 316,
Nicol & Nielsen, supra note 9, at 181.
See id. (discussing use of Derwent, a database, in the patent search).
Id. at 87-88, 182.
Id. at 182.
Id.
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"[a]nything beyond three is probably too many."12 9 In their U.S.
interviews, Walsh, Arora & Cohen heard larger numbers but
similar ratios. Characterizing the reports of about ten industry
respondents, the authors said that an initial search would turn
up hundreds of patents that they would have to consider, a
number that was surely higher than in the past, but that after
analysis the number that they would need to address would
range from zero to a dozen.3
How many upstream patents does it take to derail a project?
That evidently depends in part on how soon the patents are
discovered. In both the United States and Australia, respondents
indicated that numerous patents would be more likely to deter a
firm from pursuing a project at the outset than to cause it to
abandon a project once it was underway.' A lawyer for a
biotechnology firm told Walsh, Arora & Cohen that "[w]e start
very early on ... to assess the patent situation. When the patent
situation looks too formidable, the project never gets off the
ground.... Once you are well into development, you get patent
issues, but not the show stopper that you would identify early
on." "' 2 The authors nonetheless concluded that the patent
landscape is a relatively minor consideration in determining
which research projects to take into development.'3 3 By contrast,
hearing similar stories from their Australian respondents, Nicol
& Nielsen concluded that "it is vitally important to acknowledge
that it is possible that a number of potentially anticommonsaffected projects do not come onto the radar, because such
projects will have been abandoned well before any difficulty of
negotiating with multiple parties is encountered." 4
These interviews offer qualified support for the anticommons
hypothesis.'
They suggest that the patent landscape for
biomedical research is becoming more complex and that the cost
of surveying that landscape and negotiating necessary licenses is
rising, but that in most cases firms are able to work through the
patent issues and find R&D projects to pursue that are not
unduly burdened with IP rights. At the same time, they suggest
that the risk of an anticommons, although perhaps smaller than

129.
Id. at 183.
130.
Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents,supra note 9, at 294.
131.
Id. at 303; Nicol & Nielsen, supra note 9, at 186-87.
132.
Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents,supra note 9, at 303.
133.
Id.
134.
Nicol & Nielsen, supra note 9, at 187.
135.
Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents, supra note 9, at 303, 332; Nicol &
Nielsen, supra note 9, at 187-90.
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might have been feared a decade ago, is nonetheless quite real in
the calculations of product-developing firms. If a potential
anticommons is identified at an early enough stage, the risk of
bargaining breakdowns sometimes leads firms to avoid R&D
pathways that would call for too many licenses in favor of
projects for which the IP landscape is clearer.'3 6
Larger studies focused on downstream freedom to operate
practices within product-developing firms might help to clarify
the magnitude of the costs, perceptions of the risk of bargaining
breakdowns, the extent to which these costs and risks drive R&D
decisions in firms, and the overall impact on R&D investments.
B.

Upstream Effects

Although inconclusive with respect to downstream effects,
the studies to date provide more data about the impact of IP
rights on upstream research, particularly in academic
laboratories. In that setting, the studies suggest that scientists
typically ignore patents, and that for the most part, they get
away with it.' 37 Although actual infringement litigation against
universities is not unheard of,'38 it is rare.'39 It is more common

136.
It is not clear whether it promotes efficiency for firms to avoid R&D pathways
that are characterized by more patents. Cohen & Walsh suggest that redirection of effort
away from areas where there are many patents presents a tradeoff between the loss
associated with "having fewer people work on a problem and a potential gain from having
a... more diverse research portfolio." Cohen & Walsh, supra note 30, at 11-12. This
assumes that the presence of many patents indicates that other firms are working on the
R&D pathway. A less optimistic possibility is that, if the patents are held by universities
or by other institutions that are not themselves engaged in product development, no firm,
or too few firms, will be willing to pursue an otherwise promising R&D project.
137.
See, e.g., Nicol & Nielsen, supra note 9, at 178 (quoting observation of
respondent that most people in the academic field do not worry about patent
infringement).
138.
Recent examples that have generated appellate opinions include Merck KGaA v.
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (patent infringement action against, inter
alia, Scripps Research Institute based on use of patented molecules in preclinical research
sponsored by pharmaceutical firm); Baum Research & Development Co. v. University of
Massachusettsat Lowell, 503 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (patent infringement and breach
of contract action against university licensee); Pennington Seed, Inc. v. ProduceExchange
No. 299, 457 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (patent infringement action against university
and university officials, including a faculty member); and Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (patent infringement action against university by former faculty
member based on use of patented inventions in government-sponsored academic
research). A 2001 U.S. General Accounting Office report on state immunity in
infringement actions identified thirty-two infringement actions against state institutions
of higher education that were brought in federal court and another five such actions that
were brought in state court since 1985. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: STATE IMMUNITY IN INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS 10-11 (2001).
139.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 138, at 7.
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for patent holders to require universities to get patent licenses.'
There have been some notorious examples of patents on research
tools that required enormous investments in transaction costs
within the research community to work out acceptable license
terms, including the oncomouse and cre-lox patents licensed
exclusively to DuPont14 ' and patents on genes associated with
breast cancer that were licensed exclusively to Myriad
Genetics.' But evidently most academic researchers do not find
themselves on the receiving end of patent enforcement. Walsh,
Cohen & Cho found that only 1% of survey respondents working
in the fields of genomics and proteomics-fields characterized by
extensive patenting-reported either changing or significantly
delaying their research plans as a result of patents,
and none
4
reported abandoning a line of research entirely. 1
An important omission from the data is the perspective and
experience of research-performing institutions, as distinguished
from individual scientists." Some rights holders, such as
DuPont, may pursue site licenses from universities rather than
pursuing individual scientists.' Short of litigation, universities
may be facing enforcement measures such as letters advising
them that faculty members are infringing patents and
demanding that they enter into license agreements. 4 ' Demand
letters could impose considerable transaction costs on
140.
See Murray, The Oncomouse that Roared, supra note 96, at 24; Nicol & Nielsen,
supra note 9, at 11, 48-49.
141.
See supra notes 93-108 and accompanying text (explaining the history and
problems of the oncomouse patent).
142.
See supranote 91 and accompanying text.
143.
Walsh et al., Where Excludability Matters, supra note 30, at 1190. Respondents
in a supplemental group of scientists working on important signaling proteins were much
more likely to report that they needed access to a patent for their research and having to
abandon, modify, or delay a project because of patents, but the numbers were still small.
Id. at 1199.
144.
Walsh, Arora & Cohen conducted interviews with three "business managers"
from universities but did not separately characterize the perspective of this subset of
respondents, perhaps because of its small size. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool
Patents, supranote 9, at 293 tbl.1.
145.
Indeed, this may be a more cost-effective strategy for patent holders than
pursuing individual infringers.
146.
An example that caused considerable stir among university lawyers is a letter
that Acacia Media Technologies sent to many universities in 2003 asserting that their
online learning services were infringing its patent rights on the process of transmitting
and receiving digital content over the Internet. See WESLEY D. BLAKESLEE, NAT'L AsS'N
OF COLL. & UNIV. ATTORNEYS, THE ACACIA PATENT CLAIMS AND OPTIONS FOR
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 1 (2004), available at http://www.nacua.org/documents/
Blakeslee-Acacia3.pdf (describing Acacia's infringement notice campaign). For a general
discussion of demand letters and how to respond to them, see generally Gregory A. Duff et
al., Patent Trolls (and Other Bad News) Lurking in Your Mailbox: Handling Cease-andDesist Letters in the USA, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAc. 442 (2008).
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universities even if they do not ultimately result in either
litigation or licensing. Further research might shed light on how
common such demand letters are, who sends them to
universities, and what costs universities incur in responding.
University scientists who infringe patents in academic
laboratories may be unaware of the costs that their institutions
are incurring to investigate charges of infringement and to clear
any necessary rights."' One might surmise that, if individual
scientists remain oblivious to these enforcement efforts as they
go about their research, they have not reached the point of
blocking research from going forward. On the other hand, it is
possible that scientists who are denied access to patented
materials do not know that a patent is involved or do not
attribute the problem to patents.
In contrast to the perceived minimal impact of patents,
scientists report that their work is interrupted with some
regularity by the need to negotiate terms of access to proprietary
materials or data.'4 8 In the Walsh, Cohen & Cho survey, 19%
reported that their most recent request for materials was
denied,'49 and many reported that in over a one-year period,
failure to receive requested materials
led to significant delays
50
and even to abandonment of projects.
Cohen & Walsh explain the difference between patents, on
one hand, and materials or data, on the other hand, largely in
cost-benefit terms, citing the relative ease of excluding
competitors from access to research inputs that cannot be readily
replicated by other researchers and the relative costliness of
tracking down patent infringers and suing them.' Nonetheless,
they find evidence of a sharing norm that retains some vitality in
the willingness of most researchers to share data and materials
with their competitors even when it is costly for them to do so."'
Observing significantly higher rates of withholding materials in
their own data than in an earlier study,' 3 Cohen & Walsh
147.
See Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 240 (stating that the top priority of academic
researchers is acquiring needed research materials, usually without much regard for
infringement issues).
148.
Id. at 225.
149.
Walsh et al., View from the Bench, supra note 30, at 2002.
150.
Id. at 2003.
151.
Cohen & Walsh, supra note 30, at 13-14.
152.
Id. at 18. Costs of sharing include the risk of losing future priority of discovery
to a competitor as well as the immediate tangible costs of duplicating and providing
materials. Id. at 15.
153.
Id. at 15, 18 ("[Tlhe rate of withholding research materials appears to have
increased from 10 percent of requests in the 1997 to 1999 period ... to 18 percent ... of
requests in the 2003 to 2004 period, possibly reflecting a significant increase in a short
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suggest an explanation for the apparent decline in sharing that
has nothing to do with commercial practices: perhaps higher
levels of NIH funding are to blame because they make
exclusionary practices more advantageous as scientists compete
more vigorously for larger grants.'
Katherine Strandburg reviews the same studies and offers a
somewhat different explanation. 5 ' Placing greater reliance on
results of the AAAS-SIPPI study,'56 she observes a greater
prevalence of difficulties in gaining access to intellectual
property, particularly for scientists in industry.'5 7 Nonetheless,
she also finds fewer problems with patented research tools than
were previously feared and suggests that more is at work in the
failure to enforce patents against researchers than "rational
forbearance" from pursuing legal claims that are not costjustified."' Strandburg sees the emergence of an "ignoring
patents" norm alongside the traditional sharing norm in
science.5 9 Noting more problems with the transfer of tangible
materials, she suggests that the difficulties arise primarily when
industry researchers are involved.'
Industry scientists, she
argues, do not share the preferences that fortify sharing norms
among academic scientists, or at least not to the same degree. 161
Strandburg also notes that the costs of sharing tangible
materials make it more difficult to enforce a sharing norm for
these resources.'6 2 Her normative story rests on an account of the
preferences of academic scientists as rational actors, including6 a
preference to learn the results of the collective research project. 1

time.").

154. Id. at 20.
155.
Katherine J. Strandburg, Sharing Research Tools and Materials: Homo
Scientificus and User Innovator Community Norms 5-8 (May 23, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript, availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1136606).
156. See supra Part II.D and sources cited therein.
157.
Strandburg, supra note 155, at 6-7.
158. Id. at 3.
159. See id. at 8-12.
160. Id. at 15-16.
161. Id. at 30-37.
162. Id. at 42-45.
163. Strandburg argues that:
the pervasiveness of the disregard for patents, its justification in normative
terms,.. . the distinction between using a tool in research and "making a profit,"
the use of reputational and shunning penalties to enforce forbearance and
sharing, and the involvement of community organizations and high-status
members as norm entrepreneurs in promoting it suggest that the "ignore
research tool patents" is a positive social norm enforced within the community of
academic and industrial researchers.
Id. at 12.
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The cost-benefit account and the norms account are not
entirely distinct. Costs and benefits lurk behind norms,6 and
norms factor into the costs and benefits of actions that violate or
conform to those norms.'65 It seems likely that both norms and
cost-benefit calculations play a role in the observed patterns of
exchange. It is nonetheless useful to distinguish the two accounts
in analyzing the implications of the studies reviewed herein for
the anticommons hypothesis.
C. Cost-Benefit Analysis
The cost-benefit account offers a straightforward explanation
for the most striking result in the studies reviewed herein-that
exchanges of materials are more likely to give rise to researchimpeding transaction costs and bargaining breakdowns than
exchanges driven by patent rights.' This result may seem to
present a challenge to the anticommons hypothesis, which
predicts transaction costs and bargaining breakdowns as a
consequence of too many property rights.'67 After all, patents are
more like property rights than the combination of self-help and
contract used to control access to materials and data. Patents
confer a legal right to exclude all others-including researchers
who make the same thing independently-from making, using,
selling, or importing an invention without the permission of the
patent owner. 6 By contrast, researchers are free to duplicate
unpatented materials and data without legal liability. As
property rights, patents might seem more likely to threaten an
anticommons than the less absolute rights held by those in
possession of unpatented materials and data.
But it is transaction costs and risks of bargaining failure
that set the stage for an anticommons; what matters is thus not
the property-like character of the underlying rights, but rather
the need to negotiate multiple agreements. As a matter of law, a
user needs to get permission from the patent owner before using
a patented invention. But as a matter of practice, both owners
and infringers routinely ignore patents in the context of

164.
See id. at 18-22, 40-47.
165.
Indeed, Cohen & Walsh find evidence of a sharing norm in the fact that sharing
research materials and results is common even though it is costly and presents a risk of
losing a competitive advantage. Cohen & Walsh, supra note 30, at 18.
166.
Id. at 9-15 (concluding that while "patents have rarely blocked academic
research," the existence of secrecy among university researchers regarding unpublished
findings and research materials can pose significant impediments to future research).
167.
See Strandburg, supra note 155, at 2-3.
168.
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
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upstream research. Would-be users thus readily gain access to
patented technology without having to engage first in costly
bargaining, a fact that minimizes the risk of an anticommons
arising from a proliferation of patents alone. On the other hand
if, as the data also suggest, exchanges of materials and data are
encumbered by costly negotiations and risks of bargaining
breakdowns, then a proliferation of MTAs and database access
agreements could potentially give rise to an anticommons even
without patents.
Cohen & Walsh distinguish patent rights from what they
call "practical excludability."'69 With or without a patent, a
scientist or institution may control access to a resource, such as a
large private database or a transgenic mouse.7 Those in control
of such a resource hold the practical power to force other users to
enter into an agreement before they will share it. 7 ' Sometimes
practical excludability and patent protection may both be
present, as in the case of patented transgenic mice.172 But
sometimes users have the capacity to duplicate patented
inventions in their own laboratories without the cooperation of
the patent owner,'7 3 and sometimes users need the cooperation of
owners before they can gain access to unpatented materials and
data.' Practical excludability has three notable attributes with
interesting implications for the anticommons hypothesis.
First, the resource must be costly for users to recreate on
their own. If users are able to duplicate the resource at
reasonable cost in their own laboratories, they may not even
become aware of purely legal obstacles such as patents.
Strandburg explains that it may be more costly for users to
duplicate materials because the materials embody considerable
tacit knowledge about how to produce them or because of the
169.
Cohen & Walsh, supra note 30, at 13.
170.
Id.
171.
See id. at 13-14 (describing ability of owners of restricted material to simply
refuse to cooperate with those seeking access to it).
172.
David Mowery and Arvids Ziedonis have examined MTAs at the University of
Michigan and found that they are often complements to patents rather than substitutes.
David C. Mowery & Arvids A. Ziedonis, Academic Patents and Materials Transfer
Agreements: Substitutes or Complements?, 32 J. TECH. TRANSFER 157 (2007).
173.
It is tempting to speculate that the patent law requirement for an enabling
disclosure of how to make and use the invention, 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000), forces inventors
to codify their inventions and thereby puts researchers in possession of the invention
without the need for further consultation with the inventor. But it seems from the studies
reviewed herein that many researchers are infringing patents of which they are not
aware, suggesting that they are learning how to make and use these inventions from
sources other than patent disclosures. See Strandburg, supra note 155, at 8 (stating that
only 5% of university researchers check for patents related to their research).
174.
Cohen & Walsh, supra note 30, at 13-14.
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importance of standardization for the research.1 75 The same may
be true of new methods or data. If it is costly for users to recreate
17 6
the resource, it may also be costly for the owner to provide it,
although this is not a necessary feature of practical excludability.
The costliness of sharing may make owners less willing to share;
on the other hand, owners may be able to exchange the
practically excludable resource for value that helps defray its
costs.'" As long as it is cheaper for the owner to share the
resource than it is for the user to recreate it, there are potential
gains from exchange that stand to be dissipated through
transaction costs or lost through bargaining breakdowns.
Second, the owner must be able to exclude users from the
resource at low cost. This is an important distinction between
patents and practical excludability. Enforcement of a patent is a
high cost endeavor; failure to share materials and data with
users who cannot otherwise duplicate them may require little or
no effort on the part of the owner. 178 Exclusion becomes more
costly if the owner needs to share the resource to secure patents
or other rewards,'7 9 or to avoid reputational penalties. When it is
cheap for owners to exclude users, exclusion is more likely.
Third, and most interesting for the anticommons hypothesis,
the burden of inertia rests on the user to overcome transaction
costs before proceeding with the use. This is another important
distinction between patents and practical excludability. If a
patent is the only obstacle to use of a technology, the burden of
inertia rests on the patent owner to detect and stop the
infringing activity, generally after it is under way. The patent
owner has a legal remedy, but this remedy is not self-executing.
Infringement litigation is costly and fraught with risks. The cost
and risk may seem worthwhile if market exclusivity in a
lucrative product is at stake, but if the user is an academic
researcher who is not close to developing a commercial product,

175.
Strandburg, supra note 155, at 42.
176.
It may consume costly materials and the time of skilled laboratory personnel to
reproduce tangible materials and to ship them off, or to train the user to produce the
materials independently. Id. at 42. Even in the case of data, it may be costly for the owner
to provide access in a form that is readily usable by others or to explain how to use a
database. Moreover, as Cohen & Walsh elaborate, sharing a resource with competitors
may deprive the owner of a competitive advantage in future research, at the cost of losing
future priority of discovery and attendant future rewards. Cohen & Walsh, supra note 30,
at 4-6.
177.
Payment may take many forms, including cash, acknowledgement in
publications, collaboration on future research, or license rights to future discoveries.
178.
Cohen & Walsh, supra note 30, at 9, 13-14.
179.
See supra note 173. For inventions and discoveries that may be effectively
disseminated in writing, it may be impossible to restrict dissemination after publication.
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the owner may conclude that the costs of enforcement do not
justify the potential gains. The higher the costs of enforcement,
the less likely enforcement becomes. In this environment,
researchers may feel that it is generally safe to proceed without a
license, even when they are aware of the patents.
Compare the position of a researcher who wishes to use a
tangible research tool that she cannot readily duplicate in her
own laboratory. If it is cost-prohibitive to duplicate the tool, the
burden of inertia rests on the user to persuade the party in
control to agree to share it before proceeding with the use. The
owner doesn't have to bring an infringement action in order to
force researchers to pay, but can sit back and wait for users to
seek access and then bargain over terms. The tool may or may
not be covered by a patent, and the researcher who seeks access
may or may not be aware of the patent if it exists. The obstacle
that academic researchers take note of is not likely to be a
patent, but instead a restriction on access to something that is
costly to duplicate without a license. The need for ex ante
cooperation from the owner requires the researcher to incur
transaction costs before proceeding in a way that the remote
future possibility of infringement liability does not.
This highlights
an interesting dimension
to the
anticommons problem that Heller & Eisenberg did not address:
the burden of inertia matters in predicting the likelihood of use
in the presence of high transaction costs. When the burden of
inertia to clear rights in advance is on users-as it is when
researchers seek access to materials or data from someone elsehigh transaction costs work to the detriment of users, creating a
risk of underuse. The user must incur these costs before using
the resource, and if the transaction costs exceed the expected
value of the use, it will not happen. But when the burden of
inertia to enforce rights against infringers after the fact is on
owners-as it is when users infringe patents-high transaction
costs work to the detriment of owners, mitigating the risk of
underuse. The more costly it is to enforce patents, the less likely
it is that owners will go to the trouble, making it less risky for
users to proceed without first bargaining for a license.
Of course, this dichotomous account of the burden of inertia
is a simplified story that may not capture the nuances of every
potential transaction. One can imagine circumstances in which
the party whom I have pictured as free of the burden of inertiathe unlicensed user in the case of patents or the owner of the
resource in the case of practical excludability-is unhappy with
the status quo and motivated to seek a deal rather than to leave
it up to the other party to make the first move. A patent infringer
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may fear legal liability and want to secure a license before
proceeding further with R&D, even though the patent owner is so
far unaware of the infringing activity or willing to ignore it for
now. As for material transfers, some owners may affirmatively
want to disseminate their materials for profit and be motivated
to seek out potential users as customers, incurring transaction
costs along the way rather than leaving the burden of inertia on
would-be users. Moreover, the burden of inertia may shift as the
situation unfolds. If the patent owner takes action to enforce the
patent, the infringer may need to incur significant costs to
respond. Even if the user makes the first move, an owner of
materials who wants to enter into a lucrative transfer will need
to incur transaction costs in order to get to that point. But
despite the plausibility of these alternative scenarios, the
recurring observation in multiple studies that negotiations over
transfer of materials are more likely to block research than
patents suggests that the simplified account holds true much of
the time. The result is, on one hand, to mitigate the risk of an
anticommons arising from a proliferation of patents alone and, on
the other hand, to aggravate the risk of an anticommons arising
from a proliferation of resources that are characterized by
practical excludability.
For purposes of refining the anticommons hypothesis, what
matters is that high transaction costs to clear property rights do
not necessarily lead to inefficient underuse. Not every property
right is like a padlock on a door that cannot be opened without
first tracking down the owner and negotiating to use the key.
Some property regimes put the burden on the owner to identify
and pursue those who have gained access without permission. In
such a regime, the costlier it is to enforce property rights, the less
likely it is that enforcement will occur, and the safer it is to
proceed without a license.
The burden of inertia may provide an adjustable mechanism
for shifting the balance between ex ante incentives for innovation
and downstream risks of an anticommons without changing the
underlying property rights. Where the burden of inertia lies may
sometimes appear to be mere happenstance-a fortuitous
consequence of the cost of replicating a particular resource, or an
inadvertent byproduct of the costs of enforcing legal rights in a
society that cares about due process. But the burden of inertia
can sometimes be adjusted as a design feature of property
regimes. Legal proceedings may be elaborate or simple. Burdens
of proof may be on plaintiffs or defendants. The sheriff may lend
owners a hand or leave them to fend for themselves.
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Consider the case of patents. As noted, ordinarily the burden
of inertia to enforce patents rests on patent owners. 8 ° But in the
case of patented drugs, Congress has shifted some of that burden
from owners to infringers. Under the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, sometimes known as the
Hatch-Waxman Act, 181 patent owners who seek to exclude
generic competitors from the market are not limited to the slow
and costly process of seeking a judicial remedy for infringement
but may use their patents to defer FDA approval of a generic
version of a patented drug.'
The statute requires the
manufacturer of a generic version of a previously approved drug
to certify to the FDA that its product does not infringe any valid
patents, even if it otherwise meets the FDA's standards for
approval.' If the generic manufacturer challenges the patent,
the owner may file a lawsuit to establish that the patent is valid
and infringed. 4 But the owner need not await a judicial remedy
to get relief. While the lawsuit is pending, and without
evaluating its merits, the FDA will enter an automatic 30-month
stay of approval of the generic product.' The net effect is similar
to a preliminary injunction against the generic product, but
without the usual burden on the patent owner to demonstrate a
likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, a balance of
hardships in its favor, and impact on the public interest.'
Although this enhanced benefit to patent owners gains leverage
from a legal regime outside the patent system, it is hardly an
inadvertent byproduct of FDA regulation. The statute explicitly
directs the FDA to consider patent protection and the status of
infringement litigation in determining the effective date of
product approval.'8 7 The result is a significant shift in the burden
of inertia from the patent owner to the alleged infringer.
A similar shift in the burden of inertia has occurred between
copyright owners and creators of academic coursepacks as a
consequence of judicial decisions holding commercial copy centers
180.
Cohen & Walsh, supra note 30, at 9, 14.
181.
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 [hereinafter Hatch-Waxman Act] (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., and 35 U.S.C.).
182.
21 U.S.C. § 355(b), (c), (j) (2006).
183.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006).
184.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(B)(iii) (2006).
185.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(C)-(D) (2006); see also Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d
1335, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that the Hatch-Waxman Act does not require the
FDA to review patents for validity and infringement).
186.
See, e.g., Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(reciting standards for preliminary injunctions).
187.
21 U.S.C. § 355(b), (c), (j) (2006).
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liable for making and selling photocopies of copyrighted
materials for classroom use.'88 Although the copyright statute
explicitly permits fair use of a copyrighted work, including
"reproduction in copies.. . for purposes such as ...teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use),"'89 the courts have
held that a for-profit copy center that makes such copies for sale
to students is not entitled to claim fair use. 9 ° Fearing liability for
infringement, many copy centers thereafter began requiring that
professors obtain licenses to reproduce all copyrighted works
before they would make copies of coursepacks. 9 ' The result has
been a dramatic shift in the burden of inertia from copyright
owners onto professors who use copyrighted works in teaching

materials. 192
If policymakers were so inclined, one could also imagine
ways of shifting the burden of inertia from the owners of patents
on research tools onto infringers of those patents. The studies
reviewed herein suggest that academic researchers often get
away with patent infringement, 93 and those who fear that
patents could impede academic research might consider that a
good thing. But suppose one believed that the high costs of patent
enforcement were preventing owners of research tool patents
from receiving adequate compensation for their innovations from
the researchers who use them.' One might try to lighten the
burden of inertia on patent owners by making it easier for them
to get preliminary injunctions against unauthorized use of their

188.
See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 138891 (6th Cir. 1996) (determining that copy shop's preparation of student "coursepacks" did
not satisfy the fair use test); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp.
1522, 1535-36, 1547 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (concluding that Kinko's was not entitled to a fair
use defense when it copied and sold excerpts of copyrighted works destined for classroom
use).
189.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
190.
Princeton,99 F.3d at 1389.
191.
See STANFORD UNIV. LIBRARIES & ACADEMIC INFO. RES., COPYRIGHT & FAIR USE
(2007), http://fairuse.stanford.edu/CopyrighLandFair UseOverview/chapter7/7-a.html.
192.
See, e.g., id. ("It is the instructor's obligation to obtain clearance for
[copyrighted] materials used in class."); UNIV. OF TEX. SYS., FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED
MATERIALS (2005), http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/Intellectualproperty/COPYPOL2.HTM
(promulgating "Rules of Thumb" to aid students and professors in their understanding of
fair use and recommending that off-campus copy shops obtain permission before copying
materials for academic coursepacks).
193.
See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
194.
For a defense of the importance of providing effective protection for research tool
patents, see Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 496 F.3d 1334, 1348, 1352-53
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (Rader, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). For an argument
that exemptions from infringement liability should be narrowly construed, see Elizabeth
A. Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do UniversitiesDeserve
Special Treatment?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 923, 945-48 (2006).
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inventions in research. Or, one might borrow the power of federal
research sponsors over grantees to facilitate enforcement by
patent owners, much as Congress has borrowed the power of the
FDA over drugs to reduce the burden on owners of drug
patents.'9 5 Research sponsors might, for example, require
grantees to promise to exercise due diligence to avoid patent
infringement or to affirm that the work for which they seek
funding will not infringe patents. They might also retain the
right to suspend grant funding for patent infringers.
Of course, each of these shifts in the burden of inertia
benefits owners rather than users, thereby tending to aggravate
the risk of an anticommons. If policymakers are more worried
about creating an anticommons than they are about fortifying
upstream R&D incentives, they might have quite the opposite
impulse. Rather than making patent enforcement cheaper,
policymakers might make it more costly. In fact, federal funding
agencies have shown little political inclination to strengthen the
hand of patent owners against their own grantees. Quite the
contrary, NIH has instead used its influence as a research
sponsor to reduce transaction costs that impede access to
proprietary research tools and to minimize the impact of patents
on academic research.'96 After the Court of Appeals for the

195.
See supra notes 181-187 and accompanying text (examining the effects of the
Hatch-Waxman Act).
196.
See, e.g., Best Practices for the Licensing of Genomic Inventions: Final Notice,
70 Fed. Reg. 18,413, 18,415 (Apr. 11, 2005) (advocating a licensing regime which allows
greater access to patented material and technology); Principles and Guidelines for
Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating
Biomedical Research Resources: Final Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090, 72,090-93 (Dec. 23,
1999) (setting forth conditions for recipients of NIH funding to "facilitate further
biomedical research" and accelerate development); Memorandum of Understanding
Between E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Company and Public Health Service (July 1, 1999),
available at http://www.ott.nih.gov/pdfs/oncomouse.pdf (granting Public Health Service
the right to use patented materials for noncommercial purposes); Memorandum of
Understanding Between DuPont Pharmaceuticals Company and Public Health Service 12 (July 1, 1998), available at http://www.ott.nih.gov/pdfs/cre-lox.pdf (allowing DuPont to
receive value for its patent rights without significantly burdening health research
conducted by Public Health Service).
The Supreme Court extended further protection from infringement liability for
upstream research with its decision in Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545
U.S. 193, 201-08 (2005), broadly construing a statutory exemption from infringement
liability to cover industry-sponsored research in a university laboratory on a patented
molecule. The statutory exemption was added as part of the Hatch-Waxman Act to
permit clinical testing of generic versions of patented drugs during the patent term in
order to facilitate prompt market entry thereafter. See H.R. REP. No. 98-857(11), at 5
(1984). The statutory language provides more broadly:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the
United States or import into the United States a patented invention... solely
for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information
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Federal Circuit squarely held that nonprofit research in
universities is not categorically exempt from infringement
liability,197 the NAS put a research exemption from patent
infringement on its legislative agenda for patent law reform. 98
Given the reported infrequency of patent enforcement
against universities and academic researchers, it is interesting
that the scientific community remains concerned about this
issue. 199 Perhaps, as suggested earlier, the institutional
perspective of universities is different than the individual
perspective of researchers as revealed in the reported studies. 00
Universities may feel little confidence that past patterns of
nonenforcement of patents will continue indefinitely. Public
universities appear for now to enjoy sovereign immunity from
patent infringement actions,2 ' but there are signs that the
Supreme Court may be retreating from its prior robust concept of
state sovereign immunity.0 2 Patent infringement exposes both
under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs ....
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). The statutory basis for the exemption was not that the
research occurred in a university setting, but rather that it was related to the
development and submission of information to the FDA, a condition that commercial
research can more easily satisfy than academic research. See Merck KGaA, 545 U.S. at
202.
197.
See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("[The]
correct focus should not be on the non-profit status of Duke but on the legitimate business
Duke is involved in.").
198.
A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 82 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds.,
2004).
199. See AsS'N OF AM. UNIVS. ET AL., COMMENTS ON H.R. 1908 AND S. 1145, THE
PATENT REFORM ACT OF 2007, at 5 (2007), http://www.nacua.org/documents/
PatentReformActComments.pdf (advocating for the "inclusion of an experimental
research exemption in any patent reform legislation that is enacted").
200.
See supra notes 144-145 and accompanying text.
201.
See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 683-84, 691 (1999) (overruling the constructive waiver doctrine in holding that
Florida neither abrogated nor waived its sovereign immunity to suit under the Lanham
Act by engaging in interstate commercial activities).
202.
See Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 691 (upholding Florida's sovereign immunity);
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 645-48
(1999) (holding that the Patent Remedy Act violated Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73, 76 (1996) (holding
that suits brought to enforce federal legislation pursuant to the Indian commerce clause
are barred by the "background principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the
Eleventh Amendment"). For a critique of these decisions in the context of patent
infringement by universities and a suggestion that the federal government should
condition receipt of federal research funds on a waiver of sovereign immunity for patent
infringement, see Jennifer Polse, Holding the Sovereign's Universities Accountable for
Patent Infringement after Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank, 89 CAL. L. REV. 507
(2001). Recent evidence suggests a possible retreat from the robust version of sovereign
immunity by the Supreme Court. See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 379
(2006) (holding that Congress has authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity in
bankruptcy cases). The Supreme Court recently sought the views of the solicitor general
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researchers and their institutions to risks of liability, but
academic institutions have endowments that might make them
more attractive targets of enforcement than individuals, and
they may be more patent-savvy and better able to appreciate
the magnitude of the liability risk."3 Universities are generally
risk-averse institutions, and they may find it challenging even
to evaluate risks of patent infringement liability. Liability
risks, as well as freedom to operate costs, increase with the
number of relevant patents, which might tempt risk-averse
institutions to curtail research in areas characterized by
extensive patents.2 "4 Traditions of academic freedom make it
difficult for university administrators to control the behavior
of scientists in order to control liability risks. Perhaps a
research exemption that eliminates the risk seems like a good
way out of this bind.
D. SharingNorms
Katherine Strandburg offers a norms-based account of
the lack of enforcement of patents in academic research.2 5
According to this account, the research community has
responded to a proliferation of patents in upstream research
by adapting its traditional norms, which in the past called
for sharing and not patenting, so that they now permit
patenting but also call for ignoring patents in the context of
university research.2 "6 She finds evidence that norms play a
role in the dissemination of research tools in the efforts of
prestigious scientific institutions, such as the NAS 0 7 and the

on a petition for certiorari in a case that could call into question the scope of state
sovereign immunity in the patent law context. See Biomedical Patent Mgmt. Corp. v. Ca.
Dep't of Health Servs., 128 S. Ct. 2076 (2008) (mem.) (inviting the Solicitor General to
"file a brief... case expressing the views of the United States" in a patent infringement
action brought against the California Department of Health Services that was dismissed
on sovereign immunity grounds). For the decision below, see Biomedical Patent
Management v. CaliforniaDepartmentof Health Services, 505 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
203.
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patent Swords and Shields, 299 SCIENCE 1018, 1018-19
(2003).
204.
See supra notes 123-130 and accompanying text (discussing costs of evaluating
freedom to operate in the private sector).
205.
Strandburg, supra note 155, at 8-9.
206.
Id. at 8; cf Murray, The Oncomouse that Roared, supra note 96, at 6
(recounting the scientific community's response to oncomouse, including more patenting
by universities to preserve freedom to operate).
207.

See, e.g., COMM'N ON LIFE SCIENCES, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FINDING THE

PATH: ISSUES OF ACCESS TO RESEARCH RESOURCES, at vi-xiii (1999); COMM. ON
RESPONSIBILITIES OF AUTHORSHIP IN THE BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, NATL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, SHARING PUBLICATION-RELATED DATA AND MATERIALS: RESPONSIBILITIES OF

AUTHORSHIP

IN THE LIFE SCIENCES 33-34 (2003) (concluding that the scientific
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NIH, °8 to encourage sharing and to preserve freedom to operate
in the scientific community, especially in the context of
biomedical research." 9 Empirical evidence suggests that
universities have sought to abide by the guidelines established by
these institutions in licensing their own patents.21 °
One difficulty with this account is that it is not obvious as a
normative matter why the scientific community would embrace
an "ignore patents" norm that is more robust than its sharing
norms for materials and data.211 Strandburg suggests that it is
more challenging for the scientific community to maintain
sharing norms for these resources because it is more costly to
share them and because there are greater benefits to be gained
by not sharing.21 2 Cohen & Walsh see evidence of a possible
sharing norm for materials in the fact that, despite the costs of
sharing and the benefits of not sharing, most requests for
materials and data are fulfilled.2 13 It is possible that patents lurk
behind some instances of failure to share materials, and that
withholding of patented materials pending completion of a MTA
functions as a low-cost means of enforcing rights to these
inventions against academic researchers.
Further empirical
work might help to illuminate what the relevant norms are, how
they are enforced, and how much work they do.
The norms account has some explanatory power in
understanding counterexamples in which patents have actually

community supports certain standards for sharing data and materials).
208.
See Principles for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts on
Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources: Request for Comments,
64 Fed. Reg. 28,205, 28,206 (May 25, 1999); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
NIH
DATA
SHARING
POLICY
AND
IMPLEMENTATION
GUIDANCE
(2003),
http://grants.nih.gov/grantspolicy/data-sharing/data-sharing-guidance.htm
(listing
positive effects of promoting data sharing in the scientific community).
209.
Strandburg, supra note 155, at 10-11.
210.
Pressman et al., supra note 110, at 34-35; see also CAL. INST. OF TECH. ET AL.,
supra note 109, at 5 (hortatory statement signed on behalf of nine research universities
and the American Association of Medical Colleges encouraging universities to license
inventions in accordance with normative principles).
211.
Perhaps the relevant normative distinction has less to do with sharing than
with norms and traditions of free inquiry, particularly in academic research, which is
where all scientists begin their careers. Hauling researchers into court to get them to stop
their experiments may feel like an aggressive violation of their right of free inquiry, while
failing to send off a transgenic mouse may seem more like failing to make a charitable
contribution.
212.
Strandburg, supra note 155, at 42-43.
213.
Cohen & Walsh, supra note 30, at 18.
214.
In a study conducted at the University of Michigan, Mowery & Ziedonis find
that the use of MTAs often precedes the filing of a patent application and increases the
likelihood that the university will patent the invention. Mowrey & Ziedonis, supra note
172, at 167.
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been enforced. To the extent that nonenforcement of patents
depends on the operation of social norms, one might expect that
those norms would be more effective among members of a closeknit, homogeneous community who share the same norms and
who interact with each other enough that they anticipate
reciprocal
claims and feel vulnerable to reputational
consequences if they depart from the norms.2 15 Such community
members know that in the next round, the positions of owner and
user may be reversed, making owners more likely to treat users
as they would hope to be treated themselves. Conversely, one
might expect less compliance with norms by outsiders or fringe
members of the community who have fewer concerns about
reputation and reciprocity.
This theory may explain why DuPont was relatively
undeterred by sharing norms when it sought to enforce the
oncomouse and cre-lox patents. Controversy over the licensing of
these patents is sometimes presented as a clash between
corporate and academic cultures.216 But few corporate-academic
interactions in biomedical research have been as protracted and
difficult as this one. Perhaps DuPont, whose core business is
chemistry,2 ' was less concerned about the traditional sharing
research than firms from the
norms of biomedical
biopharmaceutical industry that had more pervasive interactions
with academic biomedical scientists. If the "ignore patents" norm
is more effective within the biomedical research community than
it is between community members and nonmembers, the
community may have reason to be concerned about the future. As
biomedical research draws increasingly on research from other
fields, such as information technology2 "8 and nanotechnology,2 19
researchers may find themselves at greater risk of trespassing
215.
Strandburg, supra note 155, at 41-42.
216.
See Murray, The Oncomouse that Roared, supra note 96, at 1 ("The Oncomouse
is a prominent example of the increasingly common collision between two institutionsacademic and commercial science.").
217.
For a history of R&D at DuPont, see DAVID A. HOUNSHELL & JOHN KENLY
SMITH, JR., SCIENCE AND CORPORATE STRATEGY: DUPONT R&D 1902-80 (1988).
218.
See NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BIOMEDICAL
INFORMATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE IMPLEMENTATION GROUP 5 (2000),
http://www.bisti.nih.gov/bistirecommendations.cfm (recommending the creation of a
consortium to facilitate "the sharing of information across the NIH on emerging scientific
opportunities in biocomputing").
219.
See Kelly Y. Kim, Research Training and Academic Disciplines at the
Convergence of Nanotechnology and Biomedicine in the United States, 25 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 359, 361 (2007) (noting the mix of curriculum that tends to produce
nanobiotechnologists); see also NIH BIOENGINEERING CONSORTIUM, NANOSCIENCE AND
NANOTECHNOLOGY: SHAPING BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH (SYMPOSIUM REPORT) (2000) (on file
with the Houston Law Review).
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upon patents held by institutions outside the biomedical research
community who feel less constrained to observe the community's
sharing norms.
Community norms might also be ineffective at deterring
infringement actions against universities by disgruntled faculty
members. We have already seen an example in the case of Madey
v. Duke.22 ° Patents have so far played a relatively small role in
intra-academic disputes. But a patent infringement claim worked
for Professor Madey, and it would not be surprising to see other
unhappy professors play that card in the future.22 ' Although
typically universities own the patents on inventions made by
faculty, faculty members sometimes obtain patents on inventions
that universities have elected not to pursue.222 If the faculty
member
later leaves
the institution
under unhappy
circumstances, that patent may be a valuable weapon in any
ensuing legal dispute.223 In the context of such disputes,
aggrieved faculty members could be motivated to pursue a
winning legal theory even though it is not cost-justified and
violates traditional norms.
To the extent that the scientific community relies on sharing
norms to forestall anticommons problems, one might wonder
about the durability of those norms looking forward. Fiona
Murray and Scott Stern have suggested that the impact of
intellectual property on the scientific community may shift over
time as legal rules and social norms interact.2 24 In the past
decade the biomedical research community has taken numerous
measures to fortify its sharing norms in the face of perceived
220.
Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Professor Madey owned
patents on laboratory equipment that he used to perform research at Duke University.
After his relationship with Duke unraveled and Duke replaced him as principal
investigator on a grant, Professor Madey sued on a variety of legal theories, including
patent infringement. Id. at 1352-53. For a review of the implications of Madey for
university patent infringement liability, see Eisenberg, supra note 203.
221.
Madey, 307 F.3d at 1364; see also Eisenberg, supra note 203, at 1019.
222.
If a university that is receiving federal funding does not elect to retain title to
an invention, U.S. law provides that "the Federal agency may consider and after
consultation with the [university] grant requests for retention of rights by the inventor."
35 U.S.C. § 202(d) (2000).
223.
Although Professor Madey's lawsuit remains unusual, a front page article in the
Wall Street Journal in 2006 predicted more legal disputes between universities and
faculty in the future as universities become more businesslike in their management of
research on campus, intervening more in decisions about research rather than deferring
to faculty autonomy. Bernard Wysocki, Jr., Ivory Power: Once Collegial, Research Schools
Now Mean Business, WALL ST. J., May 4, 2006, at Al.
224.
Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Learning to Live with Patents: Assessing the
Dynamic Adaptation to the Law by the Scientific Community (Apr. 2008)
(unpublished
manuscript,
available
at
http:/imio.haas.berkeley.edu/
WilliamsonSeminar/murray04l7O8.pdf).
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incursions by conflicting incentives to protect and enforce
intellectual property. 25 These measures have had some success in
influencing the behavior of universities as licensors of patents,22 6
but they have been less successful in influencing the behavior of
scientists as providers of research materials and data. If
anything, it appears that restrictions on dissemination of these
"practically excludable" resources are becoming more common
over time,227 suggesting that sharing norms may be weakening.
The studies reviewed herein all occurred close together in time,228
making it difficult to project with confidence how the observed
behavior patterns, and the norms on which they rest, will persist
in the future.
If there is indeed an "ignore patents" norm within the
scientific community that serves to forestall potential
anticommons problems arising from a proliferation of patents in
biomedical research, it might make sense to adjust the patent
laws to reflect that norm rather than relying upon noncompliance
and nonenforcement under the current law. Widespread
disregard of patent laws in respectable institutions like
universities threatens to engender disrespect for the patent laws,
to the detriment of patent owners. If you live in a community in
which patent infringement is pervasive and practiced on a
regular basis by all of your competitors and collaborators, when
the occasional outlier (such as DuPont or Myriad Genetics)
decides to enforce a patent, the patent laws seem arbitrary and
unfair. An obvious parallel is the widespread disregard of the
copyright laws by young music listeners.22 9 Sporadic enforcement
efforts by the recording industry have been largely ineffective
and have failed to arrest the decline in respect for the copyright
laws.22 ° Perhaps copyright owners would be better served by a
narrower set of rights that were more widely respected.2 3' If the
proliferation of patent rights in biomedical research has led to
widespread patent infringement by academic scientists, it is

225.
See supra notes 205-214 and accompanying text.
226.
See Pressman et al., supra note 110, at 38-39.
See Cohen & Walsh, supra note 30, at 17-18 (comparing their results to those of
227.
earlier studies).
228.
See sources cited supra notes 205-214.
229.
Yuval Feldman & Janice Nadler, The Laws and Norms of File Sharing, 43 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 577, 582 (2006).
230.
Id. at 589-91.
231.
Cf Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can
Teach Us About PersuadingPeople to Obey the Copyright Laws, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
651, 680-82 (2006) (describing norms against copying that are widely respected within
the jamband community).
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worth considering whether patent owners would be better served
by a patent system that drew boundaries that prestigious
institutions, such as universities, could abide by and respect.
IV. CONCLUSION

Over the past decade, empirical studies have investigated
whether a growing number of IP claims have caused a tragedy of
the anticommons in biomedical research. These studies have
focused primarily on the effects of intellectual property on the
research science community itself, limiting their value as a test
of the Heller & Eisenberg hypothesis that too many upstream IP
claims could impede downstream product development. Reports
of interviews with attorneys suggest that product-developing
firms face a growing burden of transaction costs to identify and
clear rights, and that too many patent rights will deter product
development if identified at an early stage. But the data are more
extensive with respect to the impact of patents and other
proprietary restrictions on the activities of working scientists.
Survey results from scientists suggest that, although commercial
scientists face more obstacles from intellectual property than
academic scientists, in both settings it is rare for an ongoing
project to be stopped because of patents. Within the academy,
scientists generally ignore patents and rarely face patent
enforcement. Perhaps this reflects the continuing vitality of
sharing norms in academic science, or perhaps patent owners
conclude that enforcement of patents against academic
researchers is not worth the cost. On the other hand, scientists in
both academic and commercial laboratories report more problems
in gaining access to "practically excludable" resources such as
tangible materials and data that they cannot readily duplicate in
their own laboratories.
These results point to an important qualification of the
anticommons hypothesis. As framed by Heller & Eisenberg, the
risk of underuse in an anticommons arises when too many
property rights lead to excessive transaction costs and risks of
bargaining failures. But bargaining and transaction costs do not
always precede the use of resources that are protected as
property. Sometimes, as in the case of patents, the burden of
inertia is on the owner of the property right to detect violations of
its rights and sue for infringement. In this context, high
transaction costs make enforcement less likely, and unauthorized
use more likely, mitigating the risk of an anticommons. On the
other hand, when it is easy for owners to exclude users from
access to resources, as in the case of "practically excludable"
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materials and data, the burden of inertia is on users to persuade
owners to permit access, whether or not the resource is covered
by formal property rights such as patents. In this context, high
transaction costs make use less likely, aggravating the risk of an
anticommons. The burden of inertia might sometimes be
adjusted in the design of legal rules, offering another mechanism
for calibrating the balance between the costs and benefits of
property rights.

